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Title: A Policy Analysis and Critique of United States Economic Sanctions Against the 
Islamic Republic of Iran: 1979-Present  
 
 
 For a variety of reasons since 1979, the United States of America has 
severed all political ties and retreated to a policy of enacting economic sanctions against 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. Such reasons include security concerns and human rights 
abuses. Historical research and surveys of economic data suggest that the sanctions have 
had limited effectiveness on the Iranian economy. Furthermore, the increasing tension 
between the United States and Iran caused by sanctions would also suggest that the latter 
is unlikely to curb its foreign policy to suit the interests of the U.S.  My research indicates 
that despite the current malady of issues that define the American-Iranian relationship 
today, a once prosperous and peaceful partnership existed between the two countries only 
a short time ago. In conclusion, it will be shown that both countries would be financially 
and militarily better off if sanctions were eased and their peaceful partnership might be 
restored.  
 
 
   
 
v 
 
 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
 
NAME OF AUTHOR: Justin Daehym Oreizi  
 
 
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: 
  
 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR  
 University of Hawai’i at Manoa, Honolulu, HI  
 
 
DEGREES AWARDED 
  
 Master of Arts, Conflict and Dispute Resolution, 2014,                 
 University of Oregon  
   
 Bachelor of Arts, History, 2012, University of Hawai’i at Manoa  
 
 
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST 
  
 Foreign Policy, United States-Iranian Relations, Mediation  
 
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
  
  
 Family Mediation Intern, Prairie Land Conflict Mediation Center 
 Champaign, Illinois 2013 
 
 
GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS 
 
 Phi Alpha Theta Honor Society Member, 2009 to present 
 
 
 
   
 
vi 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 I thank Professor Merle Weiner for taking the time to work with me and 
allowing me to cultivate this research in my own way. I am forever grateful to have had 
such a supportive and open-minded thesis chair. I thank the Conflict and Dispute 
Resolution program’s faculty and staff for fostering an environment that encourages all 
students to think critically about the world we live in. Lastly I thank my friends, 
teammates and family for always supporting and encouraging me.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
vii 
 
 
DEDICATION 
Ahmad Oreizi, 1939-2014  
Educator, Father and Baba.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
viii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter                    Page   
 
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................1  
II. THE NATIONALIZATION OF OIL .............................................................................7  
III. MONARCHY FLIES THE COUP ..............................................................................10  
IV. THE COLD WAR AND IRAN...................................................................................15 
 
V. THE WHITE REVOLUTION ......................................................................................20  
VI. DEAD KING WALKING ..........................................................................................25  
VII. 1979-2000 ..................................................................................................................33  
VIII. 9/11-PRESENT.........................................................................................................40  
IX. CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................45  
REFERENCES CITED......................................................................................................49 
 
   
 
1 
 
CHAPTER I
 INTRODUCTION 
 The diamond gemstone is one of the most precious and rarest of all rocks 
found on Earth. Brought to the Earth’s surface over thousands of years through volcanic 
eruptions and immense tectonic forces, the diamond is the quintessential symbol for 
man’s adoration and appreciation for our planet’s capacity to create beauty organically. 
So great is the patience and appreciation for the diamond that traditional wedding 
anniversary gifts do not include the diamond until the 60th such occasion—the Yellow 
Diamond Anniversary.  August 19th 2013 marked the 60th anniversary of the 1953 Iran 
coup d’état. The Yellow Diamond Anniversary. President Obama called Iranian President 
Rouhani then, not to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the coup but simply to chat. It 
had been thirty-four years since an American president had spoken with his Iranian 
counterpart. Needless to say the last thirty-four years of U.S. – Iranian relations have 
been in a word, rocky.  
 The coup saw the ousting of democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister 
Mohammad Mosaddeq and the restoration of the absolute monarchy of Mohammed Reza 
Pahlavi.  The United States had a role in the coup, and that has affected U.S. -Iranian 
relations to the present. While the United States’ admission of guilt for the part it played 
in ousting a democratically elected leader certainly will not curtail the hesitation of 
current Iranian political leaders to trust the intentions of the United States in matters 
pertaining to Iran, it does at least provide a glimmer of hope that the U.S. can learn from 
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its mistakes. Since the Iranian Revolution and subsequent U.S. Embassy Hostage Crisis 
in Iran, the United States and Iran have severed all diplomatic ties. The American policy 
towards the Islamic Republic of Iran has been diplomacy through sanctions. This allows 
academics, economists and politicians a unique opportunity to judge the practicality and 
feasibility of sanction diplomacy in an era in which armed conflict between nation states 
has fallen out of favor.  Although the United States has maintained a pro-sanction policy 
for thirty-four years, it is time for the United States to consider again the merits of a pro-
sanction approach to diplomacy.  
 Though much has been written on the subject of the effectiveness of 
sanctions on the Iranian government, many authors either assume that the reader has a 
basic understanding of the history of U.S./Iranian relations or start their analysis after the 
events of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. This is acceptable in some ways. However, this 
paper highlights the complex nature of the U.S./Iranian relationship prior to the 1979 
Iranian Revolution. Such context is necessary to understand the effectiveness of the later-
imposed economic sanctions.  
 Chapter I explores how Britain and later the United States, came to be 
diplomatically involved with Iran. Chapter I mentions the clandestine nature of how the 
West came to control a significant amount of Middle Eastern oil reserves. This event is a 
major reason why the region is consistently embattled in conflict. The historical research 
would suggest that conflict over oil in the Middle East was inevitable regardless of who 
discovered oil first. In the case of U.S./Iranian relations, that conflict would take only a 
few decades to manifest.  
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 Chapter II explains the beginning of U.S./Iranian relations and how from 
the onset it was destined to be complicated. After WWII, some Iranian political leaders 
began clamoring for the nationalization of the oil industry. Such a change of policy 
would have caused a spike in the worldwide price of oil. This was ultimately too great a 
risk for the United States. At the time, Western countries were transitioning form coal to 
oil-powered industries. A cheap and reliable source of oil would be needed to make such 
a transition.  Since U.S-Soviet relations had cooled down after the end of WWII, 
developing countries, like Iran who were neither NATO nor Eastern Bloc members, were 
forced to modernize or abdicate their autonomy. Iran’s desire to nationalize the oil 
industry was a move towards socialism. With the help of the CIA, Mohammed Reza Shah 
(hereinafter referred to as the Shah) overthrew a democratically elected prime minister 
and installed himself as monarch and leader of Iran. The immediate rewards of the 
successful coup would be sweet for both the United States and Iranian governments. 
However, a lingering aftertaste of mistrust would stay with the Iranian people.  The 
events of the 1953 coup d’état directly led to social changes in Iran in the 1960’s, which 
eventually triggered the ideas that led to the start of the Iranian Revolution. That 
revolution being the catalyst for the ending of U.S./Iranian relations.  
  Chapter III explores the ebb and flow of American/Iranian relations 
during the Cold War. In particular, chapter III looks at Iran’s usefulness to the United 
Sates relative to the context of the Cold War. Because of competition between the United 
States and Soviet Union for global dominance, many Middle Eastern countries were 
forced to take sides. The United States and Iran’s relationship became heavily influenced 
by Cold War politics. The bipolar competition between the United States and Soviet 
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Union also affected Iranian society. There probably would not have been an Islamic 
Revolution in Iran without the Cold War, even though the two events occurred 
independently of one another. The west vs. east paradigm that dominated Cold War 
policy would inspire Islamic leaders to frame animosity towards the west in a similar 
binary nature.   
 Chapter IV illustrates the social changes that occurred in Iran during the 
high point of U.S./Iranian relations.  Chapter IV illuminates the White Revolution, which 
in some cases greatly benefitted the Iranian people but also led to a sharp divide socially 
between those who preferred a society open to western influences and those who 
preferred traditional Islamic values.  This divide will reverberate through all aspects of 
Iranian society, in particular in its opinion of the United States.  Had the Shah not been 
convinced that the quickest way to modernization was through social reform, than the 
divide that developed amongst his people after the White Revolution may not have ever 
happened.  
 Chapter V serves as the transition from the prosperous relationship 
between Iran and the United States to the contemporary strained relationship defined by 
diplomacy through sanctions. The combination of the 1953 coup d’état, White 
Revolution and Cold War politics would trigger an Islamist Revolution. The Iranian 
people saw the relationship between the Shah and the United States as an affront to the 
Islamic values of the Iranian people. Though the Shah tried to modernize both the 
military and culture of Iran to be more like the United States, the Shah was ultimately 
exiled because he alienated the backbone of Iranian society. Additionally, because the 
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Shah and the United States were tied together (at least in the eyes of Islamic Iran), the 
fate of American diplomacy with Iran would suffer upon his exile.  
 Following the revolution and hostage crisis, the United States cut off all 
diplomatic ties with the newly empowered Islamic Republic of Iran and began imposing 
economic sanctions in lieu of diplomacy. Chapter VI discusses why sanctions were 
imposed and if they were effective or not. Chapter VI illustrates that the type of sanctions 
used by the United States and the justifications have changed dramatically during the 
post-revolution period in Iran.  
  Chapter VII brings the discussion on the effect and rationale of the 
sanctions from 2001 to the present day. The complex changes that have occurred in the 
Middle East in the last fourteen years have changed the trajectory of Iranian-American 
relations. Chapter VII suggests that if there is going to be a renewal of diplomacy, leaders 
from both countries are going to have to move beyond the principals of foreign relations 
theory that their contemporaries have operated under since 1979. That is to say, 
diplomacy through sanctions is not a long-term solution and relations guised with the 
Cold War are no longer relevant.  
 Finally, this paper concludes with a summary of the present status of 
U.S./Iranian relationship and an outlook for future relations between the two countries. 
While this paper is a brief overview of the relationship between these two countries, it 
builds on large academic literature. As such, it adds one more opinion to a well-studied 
aspect of American foreign policy. This analysis differs from some others in that it 
challenges some of the accepted past paradigms of foreign relations in order to allow that 
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foreign policy to move forward productively. In particular, it rejects the opinion that the 
United States and Iran are incapable of having diplomatic relations.  
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CHAPTER II  
THE NATIONALIZATION OF OIL 
 Before the United States became the chief antagonist of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, and even before it was the most coveted ally of Mohammad Reza Shah, 
the United States was a nonfactor in Iran’s diplomatic scope. That is to say, interactions 
between the United States and Iran prior to the end of WWII were so few and far between 
that they bear no need for analysis.  Instead, the United Kingdom and its once endless 
empire played the main role of token Anglo-Imperialist enemy chief Iranian antagonist 
by maintaining a presence in Persia after the discovery of oil in Masjed Soleyman, Iran, 
in 1908 (Kinzer, 2008, p.12). Although Persia (whose name changed to Iran in 1935) 
never was a mandate state of the British crown, it, like many other Middle Eastern and 
South Asian countries, desired to rid itself of British influence. The issue Iran had with 
Britain had little to do with the cultural differences between the two countries, but rather 
related to in the manner in which Britain cultivated, traded and profited from Iran’s 
resources.  
 Prior to the discovery of oil in Masjed Soleyman, Englishman William 
Knox D’Arcy negotiated an oil concession with then Shah of Persia, Mozaffar ad-Din. 
Included in the oil concession were Darcy’s exclusive rights to prospect, explore, exploit, 
transport and sell natural gas, petroleum, asphalt and mineral waxes in and out of Persia 
(Kinzer, 2008, p.14). The terms of the oil concession granted D’Arcy these rights for a 
sixty-year period. In exchange, the Shah would receive cash, a percentage of shares in the 
company and a 16% annual bonus from the net profits of the company (Kinzer, 2008, 
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p.16). The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was born. Soon after the discovery of oil, the 
Abadan Oil Refinery was constructed in western Iran and for the next fifty years it was 
the largest refinery in the world (Kinzer, 2008, p.39).   
 Throughout the early days of WWII, Iran remained neutral to parties 
involved in the war. However, when then King, Reza Shah, was unwilling to break 
diplomatic relations with Germany, Allied forces invaded. Seeing an opportunity to usurp 
the throne, Reza Shah’s son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, deposed his father by backing 
Allied forces (Kinzer, 2008, p.41). With the support of the new Shah, Allied countries 
constructed a railroad to distribute supplies from the Persian Gulf into Russia through 
Iran. By the time WWII ended, Allied countries had received a firsthand glimpse at the 
wealth of resources Iran had to offer, as well as its strategic location in the suddenly oil-
rich Middle East, making it a potentially formidable ally.  Still, the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company maintained control over said resources while Iranian nationalism was on the 
rise. 
 In 1946, the National Front Political Party of Iran came to prominence. Its 
leader was the secular Mohammad Mosaddeq. He was popular amongst Iranians because 
of his support for nationalizing Iran’s oil industry (Abrahamian, 2013, p.8).  That year, 
Iranian workers at the Abadan Oil Refinery went on strike, contending that the AIOC 
(formerly the Anglo Persian Oil Company) management paid insufficient wages and did 
not prepare and promote Iranians for management positions (Kinzer, 2008, p.149). 
However, the rift between the AIOC and Iran was much deeper than the wage laborers’ 
strike. The AIOC had drafted an agreement with the Imperial Government of Iran in 1933 
allowing the AIOC to drill for oil in 100,000 sq/mi; in lieu of paying Iranian income tax, 
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the AIOC would however pay a royalty fee of £ 750,000/year. Also included in the 1933 
agreement was a clause whereby Iran agreed to forgo its right to annul the agreement in 
the future. As oil began to develop as a large-scale international commodity, Iran’s 
wealthy oil deposits did not bear their full potential, as a majority of the region’s oil 
production was controlled by the AIOC (Kinzer, 2008, p.181).  
 In 1950, Mossadeq tried negotiating with the AIOC regarding the terms of 
their contract but the two sides were unable to reach an agreement. Nationalization of the 
oil industry became a rallying cry for those in Iran who supported Mossadeq not only for 
his policies but also for his unwillingness to capitulate to western countries (Abrahamian, 
2013, p.8).  The matter was eventually taken to the International Court of Justice, 
whereupon it was decided that the court had no jurisdiction over complaints that arose 
due to changes in a country’s constitution.  
 It is hard to argue that the deal AIOC had with Iran was unfairly slanted 
towards the United Kingdom and AIOC’s shareholders. A renegotiation of the contract 
surely would have been a good idea. The United States, who had been late to the oil 
industry in the Middle East (as compared to the French and British), had struck gold by 
partnering with the Saudi Arabian government. I would be remised not to mention that to 
this day Saudi Arabia and the United States are still partners in the oil industry. In the 
case of AIOC and Iran however, a renegotiation of terms was not in store. AIOC had 
stuck a favorable bargain at a time when a.) oil hadn’t been discovered in Iran and b.) 
coal was still the primary fossil fuel used in the industrial revolution and WWI. Only 
after WWII did the demand for oil begin to supersede coal production.  
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CHAPTER III 
MONARCHY FLIES THE COUP 
 In April of 1951, Mosaddeq’s National Political Front Party won a 
majority vote in the Iranian Senate and he was shortly thereafter appointed to the position 
of Prime Minister. In May of 1951, the Shah signed a bill into law, which called into 
effect the nationalization of Iranian oil (Kinzer, 2008, p.208). Public support was 
overwhelmingly in favor of the Shah and Mosaddeq, leaders who-in their minds- were 
willing to stand up to western domination. The British, however, did not take kindly to 
the steadfast Iranian nationalistic spirit. By September of 1951, the United Kingdom had 
effectively shut down the Abadan Oil Refinery and thus Iran’s economy. British 
personnel who had worked at Abadan had left Iran and British warships monitored the 
Persian Gulf, assuring that no shipment of petroleum would leave Iran (Abrahamian, 
2013, p.19). 
 By July of 1952, tensions in Iran were beginning to mount against 
Mosaddeq. The nationalization of oil had gone awry due to the matter of AIOC and Iran 
going to the International Court of Justice and dissidents of Mosaddeq’s government 
opposing his plan.  Though the fraction of profit the AIOC was providing to Iran was 
pittance compared to their gross profit, the amount was still enough to keep the 
developing country afloat. With the oil industry shut down, however, that income was 
lost. The once-bountiful oil laborers, now unemployed for nearly a year, began taking to 
the streets to voice their complaints (Abrahamian, 2013, p.57). Still, Mosaddeq remained 
as Prime Minister.  
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 Sensing he was losing public support, Mosaddeq began to bunker himself 
politically by taking more responsibility away from the Shah. By ordering the 
implementation of emergency powers, Mosaddeq rendered the Shah politically useless 
(Kinzer, 2008, p.212). For instance, Mosaddeq nominated his own War Minister, a job 
normally reserved for the Shah, so as to ensure loyalty within the military. The Shah 
refused to accept Mosaddeq’s nomination and tried to force his resignation but mass 
demonstrations in favor of Mosaddeq caused the Shah to relent. Mosaddeq was in a most 
peculiar situation. His support, which had once been almost unanimous throughout Iran, 
was certainly shrinking. His plan to nationalize the oil industry was not successful to this 
point. Yet, despite these setbacks, he was becoming more powerful than the Shah as 
evidenced by overstepping the Shah’s historical role in government and publically 
humiliating him when he tried to depose Mosaddeq (Kinzer, 2008, p.143).  
 From afar, it appeared that Iran was indeed a country in turmoil. By 
August of 1952, with the oil industry still inactive and the United States and United 
Kingdom in need of more oil by the day, President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill 
contacted Mosaddeq and called for the dispute between the AIOC and Iran to be resolved 
(Kinzer, 2008, p. 31). Mosaddeq however, refused and instead demanded ₤50 million in 
lost income (Kinzer, 2008, p.31). After his counter-offer was rejected, Mosaddeq closed 
the British embassy in Iran. With Iran’s oil and diplomatic relations with the West either 
strained or nonexistent, Mosaddeq’s detractors began plotting his removal from office.   
 Largely absent from this narrative to this point is the United States. 
Boggled down in the Korean War, the United States neither had the resources nor the will 
to intervene in the internal affairs of Iran. However, Secretary of State John Dulles and 
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President Eisenhower began to fear the dissolution of the Iranian senate would open the 
door for communist parties to take control over the country and, subsequently, the oil 
industry. Although communism was never a facet of Iranian politics, it was gaining steam 
elsewhere in the Middle East, especially following the establishment of the Israeli state 
vis -a-vis pan-Arabism philosophy. With pressure mounting from the British who also 
were carefully watching events unfold in Iran, the United States agreed to give the US 
embassy in Tehran one million dollars to bring down Mosaddeq (Abrahamian, 2013, 
p.64). The Shah, initially hesitant to support Mosaddeq because of the still overwhelming 
nationalism associated with Mosaddeq’s governance, agreed to comply when the United 
States threatened to depose the Shah if he did not go along. By June of 1953, the CIA had 
provided President Eisenhower with a plan for a coup. Operation Ajax was a go. And 
with it so was the end of Mosaddeq (Abrahamian, 2013, p.80). 
 Tehran is a beautiful city in the fall. The Alborz Mountains glisten lazily 
over the cityscape, faint traces of snow beginning to emerge on the peaks. The fall colors 
vibrantly punctuate the ever-developing urban landscape. Children often mingle about in 
the streets, playing until winter spoils their fun. Mosaddeq had been ousted by his 
detractors and the CIA. The Shah had come to power and with absolute devotion to the 
United States. Never before had the United States depose an elected leader who was still 
in control of the country. To this day, Iranians still resent the United States for the role it 
played in ousting Mosaddeq. There were obvious fractions of the population that 
supported the Shah and wanted Mosaddeq to leave, however, even these citizens had a 
contention with the United States. The CIA intervention, suddenly gave Iranians the 
impression that they were not in control of their political destiny. That assumed sentiment 
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of anti-self determination would reverberate throughout parts of Iranian society for the 
next several decades. Where at some point down the road it will explode into a 
magnificent scene of liberty and democracy. These were two principals the United States 
were committed to wiping out in Iran in the 20th century.  
 In a certain light the removal of Mossadeq, as Prime Minister was a 
rationale, sensible move by the United States. The nationalization of oil would have 
caused a spike in the barrel price of oil throughout the world and the United States was ill 
equipped to pay a hefty bill while it kept Central Europe and Korea on anti-Communism 
life support. Furthermore installing a puppet king, pro-American monarch, would ensure 
not only Iran’s stability as a placeholder for American policy in the region but also it 
meant that Iranian society was going to be opened to the West in ways in previously 
wasn’t. On the one hand, one can look at the quality of life of American’s and Iranian’s 
in 1953 and compare benchmark standards of: infant mortality rates, GDP per capita, 
average life expectancy and the availability of sewage, running water etc. to citizens, and 
come away thinking that perhaps it wouldn’t be the worst thing in the world if there was 
a pro-American king who wanted to modernize his country? On the other hand…trick 
simile. There is no other hand. There never was a backup plan to installing a pro-
American head of state, monarch or prime minister. That’s a problem. The urgency and 
expediency in which the Shah and the United States acted to plan and act out the coup did 
not allow for any long term cost/benefit planning. More or less it meant that as long as 
the Shah was going to be in power, the United States was going to be in power. It also 
meant that the United States was willingly allowing the usurpation of democracy in lieu 
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of a Monarch, which flew in the face of everything they were doing to control the spread 
of Communism at the time. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 THE COLD WAR AND IRAN 
Because, look, when you talk about having a democracy of our type in that part of the 
world, good God, it wouldn’t work. Would it?  
- Richard M. Nixon 
 
 Much of this paper will examine the relationship between the United 
States and Iran and how the relationship between the two countries has come to define 
their foreign policy in the latter half of the 20th century.  Earlier I discussed how the 
relationship came to be and specifically how the CIA helped install Reza Shah as King of 
the Peacock Throne, the United States-Iranian relationship flourished from 1954-1979.  
The development of Iran as an ally during the Cold War will define American policy in 
the Middle East during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford 
administrations. However, Iran’s role as a pillar for anti-communism in the Middle East 
will eventually lead to the fall of the Shah and of Iran (as an American ally).  Changes to 
world financial markets in the 1970’s, and specifically the ways in which member nations 
of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (hereinafter referred to as OPEC), 
altered American foreign policy.  By, 1979 the Islamic Revolution, was not a random, 
societal upheaval, but was the logical conclusion to the end of a monarchy, which United 
States directly and indirectly helped bring about.  
 Prior to the end of WWII, the United States had a limited sphere of 
influence in the Middle East. Traditional European powers such as France, Britain, and 
Russia enjoyed friendly trade relations with autocratic Arab rulers throughout much of 
the early 20th century. Following the end of WWII, with Europe in financial and, in some 
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cases, quite literal shambles, France and Britain were forced to scale back their presence 
in the Middle East. Seeing an opportunity to increase its global superpower image and 
capitalize on the breadth of natural resources available in the Middle East, the United 
States entered the region and never left. It is imperative that the origins of the United 
States’ presence in the Middle East are viewed through the lens of the Cold War. The 
haste and manner in which the United States came to be involved in the Middle East was 
born out of Cold War paranoia and fear mongering.  Consequently, no matter how well 
intentioned the United States’ deployment of diplomats, military personnel, and multi-
national corporations has been, the breadth of its cultural and regional knowledge is, at 
best, perfunctory.  
 The Soviet Union and United States used the Middle East as a staging 
ground for Cold War theatrics. Iran was not spared. For that reason alone the United 
States and Soviet Union became entangled in Middle Eastern affairs. With the majority of 
the world’s oil reserves in the Middle East (specifically Saudi Arabia and Iran) it is no 
surprise that both the Soviet Union and United States attempted to control the region, not 
only as a territorial buffer but also as a gas station of sorts for the rest of their global 
activities. As mentioned previously, the CIA’s entanglement in the Iranian 1953 coup 
d’état meant that the Americans would have a close relationship with the Shah, so long as 
he wanted to stay in power. Simultaneously, the United States was also involved in the 
Korean Peninsula and would soon be mired in Vietnam.  
 All of this, coupled with a policy of containment at all costs drove the 
United States to become involved in areas of the world of which it previously had not 
been. The necessity of forging relationships with oil-producing states in the Middle East 
   
 
17 
had as much to do with our need to curb the spread of communism in Asia as it had to do 
with America’s increasing appetite for oil. Following the end of WWII, the United 
States’ economy boomed and so, too, did the demand for petroleum. Therefore, the 
relationship also helped sustain America’s growth as it would continue to use oil as its 
primary fossil fuel.  
 Following the end of the British Mandate State Era, which coincided with 
the end of WWII, the Soviet Union and United States began courting Arab, Persian, and 
Pashtun (people of Afghanistan and West Pakistan) rulers with the intention of forming 
military/economic alliances.  It was Pax Americana at its finest. The formation of Israel 
as a nation state in 1947 immediately launched Israel, Palestine, and their neighboring 
states into war. Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq launched offensive attacks 
against Israel, who quite miraculously resisted the Arab offensive and eventually won the 
war, thus defending its existence as a nation state. Although Iran had voted against the 
creation of the Israeli state in the United Nations, Iran instantly recognized Israel’s right 
to exist (Cooper, 2011, p.29). The Shah saw Iran and Israel as natural allies in the region. 
Both were outsiders in an Arab sea and bastions of tolerance, moderation and anti-
communism with overlapping strategic interests (Cooper, 2011, p.29). It is important to 
note that the friendship between Iran and Israel during the Cold War was essential to the 
United State’s burgeoning “twin-pillar” policy. This meant that Iran and Israel were the 
supreme military powers of the region and therefore could act as anchors for a pro-
American policy in a region that was increasingly becoming attracted to Kremlinesqe 
demagogues.  By 1970, Iran was exporting $40 million worth of oil to Israel annually 
(Cooper, 2011, p.70).   
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 Despite the rhetoric of the United States at the time championing for 
democracy worldwide, it was completely irrelevant if the leader of a sovereign country 
was a communist, socialist, or a monarch. All that seemed to matter was that the United 
States had allies in a region that was becoming increasingly difficult to control.  
  Previously I discussed the CIA’s involvement in the 1953 Iranian coup 
d’état. Consider that during the Cold War the clandestine policy of the United States was 
to aid any democratic country from “going red” or becoming more sympathetic to the 
Soviet Union.  The Tudeh Party, which essentially was the only Communist party in Iran, 
had a loyal but ultimately disorganized and small following. Most Iranian historians 
would agree that the Tudeh Party was never going to have enough support to push Iran in 
a “red” direction.  Prime Minister Mossadeq was no communist nor did he endorse the 
Tudeh Party.  He was a democratically elected prime minister. Yet he wanted to 
nationalize the oil industry of Iran and this was enough for the CIA to intervene and 
depose him.  
  Iran, which shares a northern border with Russia (then part of the Soviet 
Union), became the optimal staging ground for CIA activities throughout the time of the 
Shah. CIA operatives were able to use Iranian land to spy on the Soviet Union.  Former 
CIA Director and then Ambassador to Iran, Richard Helms said as much in 1969: “ The 
facilities are entirely dependent on the willingness of the Shah to permit them to operate 
and to transmit promptly the information they collect” (Cooper, 2011, p.76).  
 One must also remember that Nixon’s election in 1968 came at the heels 
of the MLK and RFK assassinations. With the war in Vietnam reaching a boiling point 
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(note the Tet Offensive) President Nixon sought stable, loyal allies. Perhaps the Shah 
sensed President Nixon’s anxiety over the calamity of issues he faced and used Nixon’s 
trepidation to his advantage. Did the Shah anticipate Nixon’s détente policy as being 
counter inductive to petroleum exportation? Did the Shah take advantage of the 
precarious situation the United States found itself in at the end of the 1970’s, as an 
opportunity to increase his military superiority in the Middle East?  While most of these 
questions remain unanswered it does at least provide oneself the opportunity to reflect on 
the chaos that was Nixon’s first few years in office. It is certainly not hard to envision the 
Nixon White House focused on its immediate day-to-day relationships with foreign 
dignitaries as opposed to a more long term planning model of relations. 
 Thus, the Cold War caused developing fringe countries to ally themselves 
with either the Soviet Union or United States. Additionally, the Middle East’s vast oil 
supply made it all the more important that the United States and Soviet Union maintain 
strong alliances with Middle Eastern countries.  Military interventions on behalf of both 
the Soviet Union and United States in the Middle East ensured that the region’s 
sovereignty was in the hands of outsiders. This eventually causes immense tension, as the 
Arab and Persian world ultimately use their religious convictions as fuel for their anti-
imperialist/nationalist intentions. At the time, however, that was of no serious thought to 
the United States, as it was preoccupied in containing the spread of communism and not 
necessarily concerned with the possibility of a pan-Islamic movement. That movement in 
Iran would begin with the White Revolution, a government initiative undertaken by the 
Shah to westernize the largely rural Iranian population. Its intentions were noble but its 
effects would be felt for years to come, not all of which were positive.  
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CHAPTER V 
 THE WHITE REVOLUTION 
In the words of Abraham Lincoln, we acted “with malice toward none; with charity for 
all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right” 
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi 
 Following his return to power in the aftermath of the 1953 Coup d’état, 
Reza Shah launched the ambitious and quasi-provocative White Revolution. The White 
Revolution was a series of Iranian government reforms and projects that sought to 
industrialize, westernize, and develop the largely rural Iranian population.  In his own 
words, the Shah made his case for the White Revolution: “ The realization came to me 
that Iran needed a deep and fundamental revolution that could, at the same time, put an 
end to all the social inequalities and all the factors which caused injustice, tyranny and 
exploitation” (Shah 1967). In a vacuum, the intentions behind the Shah’s 19-point plan 
were benevolent and virtuous. However Iran, or any place for that matter, doesn’t exist in 
a vacuum. A full discussion of a few of the main points illustrates the controversy and 
backlash, and illustrates how this plan affected the trajectory of Iran’s relationship with 
the United States.  
 Education: The Shah recognized Iran’s high illiteracy rate as a major 
roadblock to modernization.  He instituted two separate programs aimed at solving this 
problem. First, he created the Literacy Corps, an alternative to military service for all 
males who held a high school diploma. Instead of serving in the military, students would 
have the option of living in rural villages for two years and working as language 
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instructors for adults and children. The second program of educational reform was the 
Shah’s mission to provide free primary education for all Iranian children. As the world 
began to accelerate into the Space Age, Nuclear Age, and beyond, the Shah recognized 
that advances in the sciences and related technologies would allow Iran to remain 
competitive in the world market and as a military power. The Shah stressed as much in 
his outline for educational reform: “The educational system of Iran should undergo a 
complete transformation in conformity with the needs and obligations of the country’s 
new society.” (Shah 1967).  By setting out to improve the primary education for Iranians 
the Shah hoped to build a foundation for Iran’s universities to flourish with homegrown 
talent and intellect.  
 While many can see the benefits of state-sponsored education and an 
aggressive campaign to stamp out illiteracy, the Shah was not without his critics, 
specifically the Islamic clerics. Traditionally all matters of education were left to the 
devices of the Mosque and its religious leaders. Religious pieties as well as traditional 
Islamic values were taught at an early age. Many clerics including Ayatollah Khomeini 
saw the Shah’s policies as a form of anti Islamism and loudly voiced their dissatisfaction 
with the Shah. Clerics saw the Shah’s expansion of government policies into the rural 
countryside as an attack against Islam, as it could be interpreted that government-
sponsored education in public schools could undercut the influence of the Mosque as a 
form of social control. Furthermore, the educational objectives desired by the Shah had a 
Western emphasis.  Again, this was seen as an affront to Islam, in spite of the fact that in 
his outline for the White Revolution emphasized the nature of Islam and its place 
amongst the Iranian people: “Two principles must remain constant and holy for us. One 
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is the reliance on spiritual principles and religious beliefs, which in our case is the 
religion of Islam” (Pahlavi, 1967, p.18). It does not appear from the Shah’s outline of 
education reform that his desire to expand government influence into rural education was 
an affront to Islamic influence, however his intentions were interpreted that way. In short, 
the Shah wanted Iran’s education system to be modeled after Western Europe and the 
United States, which for some Islamic clerics, was a problem.  
 Land Ownership/Usage: Prior to the White Revolution, Iran’s 
countryside was mostly owned by semi-feudal landlords. The land was allocated to 
peasants in a way that resembles medieval Europe sharecropping.  The Shah bought land 
at a premium from the semi feudal landowners and sold it at a discounted rate to 
peasants. The Shah saw land ownership as a way to stimulate the economy and a way to 
free 40% of the population from an outdated and oppressive form of land distribution.   
 Social Justice: For years, Iranian women were forbidden from voting and 
serving in political office. The Shah, at the behest of his wife, Queen Farah, granted 
women the power to vote, hold political office, own land, and divorce their husbands. 
This was a monumental shift in social policy for the traditionally conservative country.  
Like the issue of education reform, some clerics saw the Shah as trying to alter the fabric 
of Islamic Iranian society to reflect that of a more Western pattern. Years before, the 
Shah’s father (then King Reza Shah) banned the wearing of veils in public and ordered 
women to start dressing like their western counterparts. For years, traditional Islamic life 
seemed to lag behind the advances of women in the Western world, but in just a short 
amount of time there was a complete reversal in the freedom and liberties of women. 
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From the perspective of a Westerner, this is all well and good. However, too much 
change too quickly is a problematic way to reform any society.  
 What motivated the Shah to institute the White Revolution? There were 
probably three factors. First, the Shah’s appetite for military buildup and the insistence on 
behalf of the United States that he curb his military expenditures unless he instituted 
some degree of societal reform.  Second, the Shah was aware that by expanding the reach 
of government into previously rural areas, he was creating a more loyal populace.  In 
some cases the White Revolution was a tremendous success. Private land ownership 
increased, as did enrollment in primary schools and high schools, and universities. The 
Shah was able to develop modern systems of railways and highways.  New ports built 
along the Persian Gulf allowed more oil to be exported. Within a very short period of 
time, the Shah had implemented sweeping changes that affected almost every Iranian in 
some capacity. Thirdly, the Shah saw the advances of social issues as a way to usher Iran 
into the welcoming graces of the western world: “Real progress in our age consists of 
breaking, wherever they exist, the chains imposed over the centuries by privileged 
minorities on the deprived majorities” (Pahlavi, 1967, p.14).  For those who welcomed 
the influences of the West, this was seen as a necessary and vital step if Iran was ever 
going to be a regional power.   
 As one could have predicted, some men and women resisted these political 
and social changes. Many traditional Muslims saw these policies as reckless and 
immoral. Religious leaders were especially concerned about the breakup of their vast 
land reserves, as it would decrease their autonomy from the government.  It was precisely 
during the White Revolution that an Islamic Cleric from Qom began voicing his 
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displeasure with the Shah. Ruhollah Khomeini saw the Shah as being not only a puppet 
for the West (and Israel), but as a dishonorable Muslim. In no uncertain terms, the Shah 
was displeased with the criticism from Khomeini and for any other clerics. He went as far 
as to compare the Mullahs to “numb and dispirited snake and lice who float in their own 
dirt” (Cooper, 2011, p.109).  Shortly thereafter, the Shah exiled Khomeini to Iraq. 
Khomeini would eventually take refuge in France where he maintained a loyal, almost 
cult-like following. He would return to Iran years later, a king in his own right.  
 In retrospect, the White Revolution launched Iran into a period of rapid 
growth and development.  Though it was not uncommon for countries at the time to 
undertake government/civilian development projects, in their respective countries, one 
also must be cognizant of the fact that these Iranian projects, differed in that they 
reflected the philosophies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Both Presidents 
Kennedy and Johnson were reluctant to sell arms to the Shah (or any country for that 
matter), in short, because of the former’s less than stellar human rights record.  This 
carrot-and-stick approach to arms sales and societal reform does not undercut the benefits 
that the White Revolution had on Iranian society, but merely points out that there were 
ulterior motives to the White Revolution.  The Shah was aware that unless changes were 
made to facilitate social mobility could be achieved, his purchasing power of arms would 
be limited (Cooper, 2011, p.212). Later I will touch on how oil revenue became closely 
associated with weapons purchases from the United States.  
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Chapter VI 
 Dead King Walking  
 The relationship between Iran and the United States in the mid to late 
1970’s sets the stage for the contemporary quagmire that defines their relationship to this 
day.  Between the 1973 World Financial Crisis, the Arab oil embargo, Watergate and the 
decline of the Shah’s health, the 1970’s were quite tumultuous. All of these events in 
some way helped propagate the ideals of Ayatollah Khomeini, who would ultimately 
return to Iran in 1979 and depose the Pahlavi Monarchy. Chapter III, noted the 
significance of the political/social climate in the United States that ushered in the first 
few years of the Nixon presidency and how the various crises that Nixon faced might 
have affected his relationship with the Shah and vice versa. This chapter will focus on the 
changing complexity of the political landscape in the Middle East in the 1970’s and 
specifically how an emerging détente policy by Nixon would cause jostling amongst 
Middle East nations for military/economic superiority.  
 Since the creation of the Israeli state in 1947, the jostling amongst Arab 
nations and the state of Israel for control over water, land, and growth potential has 
manifested itself in several wars, including the 1948 War and the 1956 Suez Crisis. Both 
of these events seemed to trigger the inevitable: a massive engagement between Egypt 
and her Arab allies, and Israel. However, the results of the 1967 War were so favorable to 
the side of Israel that the idea of a pan-Arab state died in 1967, along with any concerns 
that Israel would be swept into the sea. In less than a week Israel had managed to 
infiltrate and secure these areas: Jerusalem, the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the 
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West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The land seized by Israel in the Six Day War was in 
violation of the armistice agreement that Israel had made with Egypt, Jordan, and 
Lebanon at the end of the 1948 War. That agreement made clear that Israel was not to 
expand its territory any further. Tension continued through the end of the decade and into 
the 1970’s. In October of 1973 Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal, entered Israel and 
the two sides were again at war. Known as the Yom Kippur War, Israel fought Egypt, 
Syria, Iraq, and Jordan to a virtual stalemate. The Yom Kippur War resulted in the return 
to Egypt land gained by Israel in the Six Day War.  
 The true effect of the Yom Kippur War was a direct result of the responses 
by the Soviet Union and United States.  Following in the footsteps of his predecessor 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat had dreams of a pan-Arab state. The Soviet Union 
supported this initiative since it would likely consolidate power amongst the Arab world, 
making those who were franchised by Moscow more sympathetic to the Kremlin’s 
desires. The Soviet Union widely supplied the Arab force’s military hardware throughout 
the conflict. Similarly, the United States’ modus operandi was a de facto replica of the 
Soviet Union’s, as the United States assisted Israel’s military throughout the war so that 
Israel would remain true and steady in the American twin pillar policy. The effects of the 
Yom Kippur War would reach farther than the Sinai Peninsula. Following the Yom 
Kippur War, the United States actively began taking a peacemaking approach to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The Camp David Accords in 1978 along with the Oslo I Accords of 
1993 have signified Washington’s willingness to achieve peace in the Middle East 
through Arab-Israeli accords. This, of course, is a reversal from the “twin pillar” policy 
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that sought to empower Israel and Iran as regional powers and thus enfranchise them to 
police the Arab world.  
 The willingness of Washington to achieve peace in the Arab world had to 
do with the end of the Cold War. The decline of the Soviet Union in the latter 1970’s and 
1980’s coincides with the invigoration of American political desire to create peace in 
regards to Israel and her neighbors. Of course, one must also accept than the Six Day War 
and Yom Kippur War were essentially proxy wars fought on behalf of the Soviet Union 
and United States. In terms of its relationship with Iran, the “twin pillar” policy, which 
enabled both countries to be placeholders for American interests in the region, became 
less relevant once the Soviet Union’s influence waned and the Shah was ousted. Any 
argument that frames American interest in the region as necessary to protect Israel from 
Islamic adversaries (now including the Islamic Republic of Iran) is without weight, as the 
United States continued to maintain a strong relationship with Saudi Arabia.  
 OPEC member nations, furious at the United States for actively supplying 
Israel with arms during the war, placed an embargo on the United States in October of 
1973. The effects of the oil embargo were felt almost immediately.  The sale price of oil 
per barrel being sold to the United States rose by as much as 20%. This resulted in 
increased fuel costs at the pump for Americans. Eventually gas stations had to start 
rationing supplies. American consumption of oil had risen from 2.2 million barrels per 
day in 1967 to 6.2 million barrels per day in 1973 (Cooper, 2011, p.50). With some 26% 
of those barrels coming from Iran, it is not hard to see how the Shah used the increased 
revenue from American oil consumption to increase Iran’s defense spending.  
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 It is estimated that in just 1972 alone, the Shah increased Iran’s defense 
spending from $500 million to $2.5 billion. And since the United States was the primary 
arms supplier, it essentially created a circular pattern in which Iran used oil revenue to 
buy military supplies from the United States. By 1974, Iran would be purchasing three 
times as many arms as they were in 1972. This unparalleled acquisition of arms is even 
more astounding when the size of the Iranian military increased by only 17%. What was 
the Shah doing with all of these arms? Why wasn’t the size of the Iranian military 
increasing?   
  In essence, it was an oil-for-guns swap.  This didn’t create the ideal 
climate in which to grow a trade relationship with any country, especially when one 
considers the history of political instability of the Middle East. However, given the Cold 
War context, makes it easier to understand why an oil-for-guns swap was considered to 
be desirable at the time. The United States should have realized that the Shah’s oil 
revenue, which was Iran’s primary source of income, was primarily being appropriated 
for defense spending. Remember than just a few years before the oil revenue boom, Iran 
underwent the White Revolution, a major government-funded expense. This put a strain 
on the Iranian economy, as the government tried to continue funding this initiative whilst 
keeping inflation at a minimum. In a State Department memo to then Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger, this exact issue was raised.  “The Shah’s inexhaustible appetite for the 
latest sophisticated weaponry, at higher and higher annual costs for acquisition and 
maintenance, could impact on Iranian development spending.” (Cooper, 2011, p.54).  The 
United States should have insisted that a portion of the revenue be used to keep the 
Iranian economy growing and not allow it to stagnate, but the United States was not in a 
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position to negotiate as the Arab Oil embargo continued and the Watergate scandal 
continued to preoccupy the Nixon administration.  
  True to his convictions, the Shah refused to assist his Muslim 
counterparts in fighting Israel, and continued supplying both Israel and the U.S. with oil 
throughout the embargo. This again angered many Muslims in Iran who felt that the Shah 
was betraying his religion. By December of 1973, the Yom Kippur War was over but the 
oil embargo continued. OPEC member states met in Paris in December to talk about the 
embargo and oil pricing for 1974, among other things. Iran was in a unique position to 
sway policy, as months of decreased revenue by the Arab nations as a result of their 
embargo had begun to take its toll on their respective economies. The Shah still needed to 
generate more revenue to meet his insatiable appetite for arms (which was expected to be 
$5 billion more than what he had appropriated his budget for 1974). An excellent 
statesmen and orator, the Shah was able to convince OPEC members to raise the cost of 
oil per barrel from $5.11 to $11.65 (Cooper, 2011, p.65). This resulted in a 470% 
increase in price of barrel of oil in one year alone.  OPEC members would be increasing 
their revenue to as much as $120 billion per year. In 1973, the United States spent $3.9 
billion in oil imports, but at $11.65 a barrel that number would increase up to $24 billion 
for 1974! (Cooper, 2011, p.65).  
 Indeed the rapid influx of oil wealth and, maybe more importantly, the 
development of the Iranian economy was turning Iran into a regional superpower. Time 
Magazine wrote as much in 1974, “In the 33rd year of an often uncertain reign, 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi has brought Iran to a threshold of grandeur that is at least 
analogous to what Cyrus the Great achieved for ancient Persia” (Cooper, 2011, p.285). 
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But not all was right with the Iranian monarchy. The CIA reported as much in 1974: “The 
Iranian economy grew by 33% in 1973 and was expected to grow another 40% in 1974. 
Oil Revenues will continue to exceed the economy’s absorptive capacity over the next 
few years. The Shah’s ambitious development program and arms build-up are creating 
domestic economic problems. Inflation, skilled labor shortages and urban unemployment 
are occurring.” (Cooper, 2011, p.298).  The social progress and petro wealth he had 
forged with the United States had reached its zenith. Soon the sands of change would 
sweep through the faux Western Iran. One cannot help but point out that the problems 
that the petro wealth were causing in Iran were related to the Shah’s military build-up, 
which was being sold to him by the United States. It was almost as if the CIA knew that 
by selling the Shah military hardware they were effectively shooting themselves in the 
foot with a gun they made.  
 Percy Shelley’s poem Ozymandias, describes a lone traveler stumbling 
upon the ruins of an ancient monarch. The author approaches the base of a statue, once 
built to emulate a king of kings, but now broken and desolate. The idea is that monarchs, 
or all men for that matter, are mortal. The Shah, Iran’s King of Kings, is no different than 
Ozymandias as described by Shelley. It was in 1974 that the Shah traveled to Switzerland 
on vacation only to learn that he had been diagnosed with lymphoma. The 55-year-old 
King would succumb to the disease before the decade ran out. At the time, only the Shah 
and a few close advisors knew of his condition. Had the United States known that the 
Shah was terminally sick, it might have affected their relations with Iran. For starters, the 
United States would have scaled back their military sales to Iran in the event that his 
death left a power vacuum and a new, unscrupulous ruler would suddenly be rich with 
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advanced weaponry. Secondly, the United Sates might have begun reaching out to other 
political voices in Iran, as the idea that a monarchy could continue into the later 20th 
century was becoming more unlikely.   
 1974 was not a kind year to the United States. With the effects of the oil 
embargo still being felt, the majority of Americans shed hardly a tear for disgraced 
former President Nixon as he exited office. Gerald Ford was tasked with the inauspicious 
responsibility of rebranding the image of American politicians whilst keeping the 
struggling American economy afloat. With the Dow Jones plummeting by as much as 
$300 billion in 1973, the Federal Reserve was worried that the United States would not 
be able to foot the bill for imported oil, which was expected to rise as much as $16 billion 
from the previous year. President Ford explained as much: “Sovereign nations cannot 
allow their policies to be dictated, or decided, by artificial rigging and distortion of world 
commodity markets” (Cooper, 2011, p.276).  Although all OPEC nations were also 
sovereign, Ford was implying that it was the United States’ role to control the ebb and 
flow of world markets. Unable to use force to pressure OPEC countries into lowering the 
cost of oil, the United States succumbed and the economy was beginning to crumble in 
response to the oil cartel.  
 After the oil boom of 1973-1974, Iran’s barrel production per day 
decreased to 5.4 million per day in 1975. The same issues that plagued the Iranian 
economy during its petro growth were even more exasperating in 1975, as unemployment 
and inflation continued to plague the Iranian economy. The US Embassy in Tehran 
released a report that summarizes well the dire situation that Iranians (excluding the 
ruling class) were facing: “It is impossible to believe that in the long run even as 
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seemingly strong and stable a regime as that in power in Iran can get by with changing 
the country in only a few decades from a nearly illiterate, poor, and basically peasant 
society into a well educated, reasonably affluent, modern and dynamic nation without at 
some point going through a period of serious political upheaval and perhaps even radical 
social change.” (Cooper 2011, p.241).  
 Hindsight would suggest that the willingness of the American government 
to allow price fixing of petroleum at a high cost in exchange for the Shah’s alliance in the 
Cold War Middle East proved to be economically lethal. Instead of trading high fuel 
costs for containment, the United States and Iran both shot themselves in the foot. High 
oil prices nearly capsized the United States’ economy in 1974 and the influx of petro 
wealth caused massive inflation in the Iranian economy, causing rampant unemployment. 
“The Nixon-Kissinger policy of delegating power and arms to Iran to patrol the Persian 
Gulf, defend West Asia, and safeguard the oil fields of Saudi Arabia had been torn apart 
by its own irreconcilable contradictions”  (Cooper, 2011, p.239). Coupled with the fact 
that social change in Iran had come too rapidly to take hold, it was almost as if the Shah 
was trying to stretch a rubber band connecting the US and Iran, only that band snapped 
back, creating a furious wind of Islamic blowback.  Iranian oil production would continue 
to stall for the next few years, reaching a low of 4.2 million barrels per day in 1976.  
 The reduction in output did nothing to curb the Shah’s military-build up, 
nor did it alleviate Iranian inflation. Why the Shah felt the need to build-up such a large 
amount of fighting power is a mystery. The stage was set for change in Iran. 
Unbeknownst to many, the Shah was dying (of cancer) and so too was the Iranian-
American alliance.    
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CHAPTER VII 
  1979-2000 
 In January of 1979, the Shah left Iran as an ousted king. The Iranian 
people, who for months had been clamoring for his removal, finally received their wish. 
Void of any allies in the Carter White House, the Shah was forced to leave Iran without 
any objection from the United States. Much more can and has been said about the Iranian 
Revolution, both as a turning point for Islamic political theory and as an example of the 
pragmatic implications of U.S. foreign policy.  
 As summarized previously, the fruitfulness of the Iranian-American 
partnership came to be as a result of Cold War philosophies. The United States wanted to 
contain the spread of communism in the Middle East and Iran wanted to assert itself as a 
regional superpower. The United States needed oil and Iran wanted weapons. Trades 
were made, exchanges completed and a lot of people got rich. Eventually (much to the 
awareness of the US Embassy in Tehran) this episode of economic influence took its toll 
on both the Iranian and American economies. At the same time, radical social changes in 
Iran imposed by the Shah caused Islamic clerics to distance themselves from their King. 
Exiled Mullah Khomeini kept a loyal following that only grew stronger as the fabric of 
Iranian society pulled away from Islamic values and into moral and economic despair. 
The Shah’s ailing health did not help matters and within a few months rampant protestors 
were able to force the Shah out and bring Khomeini back.  
  The relationship between the United States and Iran did not improve once 
Khomeini came to power. Many in Washington were former friends of the Shah who 
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sympathized with his willingness to model Iran after the United States.   On November 
4th 1979, around 200 Iranian students, fueled with revolutionary fervor, stormed the 
United States Embassy in Tehran and took 66 hostages. For the next 444 days, American 
diplomats and government personnel remained as hostages in Iran.  From that moment 
on, the United States began imposing economic sanctions against Iran that continue to 
this day.  
 Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott and Oegg’s define sanctions as being “the 
deliberate, government inspired withdrawal or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or 
financial relations.”  (Hufbauer, 2008, p.12) Sanctions are part and parcel of international 
diplomacy, a tool for coercing target governments into particular avenues of response. 
(Hufbauer, 2008, p.12) As one might expect, sanctions can and cannot be effective but 
not always.  Most would agree that sanctions imposed on Iran have been financially 
harmful, but ineffective in that the rhetoric put out by the Islamic Republic is constantly 
at odds with the desires of Washington. 
 Since 1979, the Iranian economy has been less than exemplarily, some of 
which can be attributed to the sanctions imposed. However, sanctions have not slowed 
the support for the current regime, one that consistently balks at following the foreign 
policy interests of the United States. 
Included below are the most influential sanctions from 1979-2000 and a brief description 
of their importance:  
Executive Order 12170 (November, 1979)  
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 Following the seizure of the US Embassy, President Carter froze all 
Iranian Government assets held in US banks. The amount frozen was $12 billion. Later 
that money would be used to settle claims by American corporations against Iran. The 
claimants held shares in the Iranian Oil Company as well as other contracts with the 
Iranian Government. (Executive Order, n.d) 
Executive Order 12211 (April, 1980) 
 This order prohibited financial transactions with the Iranian government 
by US citizens or corporations, embargoed imports, banned all travel to and from Iran 
from the United States, and impounded Iranian military in the United States. (Executive 
Order, n.d) 
 Both E.O 12170 and 12211 severely restricted the financial assets of the 
newly empowered Islamic Republic. With the economy still reeling from the Shah’s 
defense heavy budget, the Islamic Republic needed to boost aggregate capital quickly. 
With a ton of military hardware leftover from the Pahlavi era, it is not too far fetch to 
suggest that the Iran/Iraq war was beneficial for the Iranian economy. For one, it 
mobilized the labor force to support wartime industries, thus helping bring down inflation 
and unemployment.  The war helped stir up nationalist pride, which is exactly what a 
newly formed government would want to do after a revolution. Additionally, Iran’s 
petroleum exports by day would increase each year of the war.  
Executive Order 12613 (October 1987) 
 E.O 12613 embargoed all imports. Essentially E.O. 12613 was a 
continuation of E.O 12211, with only a slight yet significant difference. While E.O. 
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12211 made it illegal for companies to import Iranian crude oil and refine it in the United 
States, E.O. banned the importation of any crude oil originating in Iran. This was enacted 
because it did not, however, restrict the importation of Iranian crude oil to a third country 
where it could be refined and then shipped to the United States, nor did it prohibit 
American oil companies from purchasing Iranian crude. American companies could still 
easily, buy Iranian oil, only now they just had to refine it in another country, usually in 
the Caribbean (Grenada, Trinidad & Tobago, Aruba etc.) (Slavin, 2007, p.74) 
Executive Order 12959 (May 1995) 
 This executive order banned all trade between the United States and Iran, 
prohibited all imports of refined products from third countries using Iranian crude oil, and 
prohibited American companies from buying Iranian crude oil. Up until this point, U.S. 
companies were not prohibited from exporting goods to Iran. Also, E.O.12959 closed up 
all third country crude oil loopholes that were allowed under E.O. 12959.  (Executive 
Order, n.d) 
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (August 1996)/ Executive Order 13059 (August 1997) 
 This act prohibited investment in the Iranian petroleum sector by US 
companies and sought to make all U.S. sanctions unilaterally applied to all NATO 
countries. Although the act was successful in prohibiting American investment in the 
Iranian petroleum sector, NATO allies became infuriated with the reach of the Clinton 
Administration into their economic relations with Iran. For the first time, there was a 
decisive shift in world opinion with regards to the U.S. economic sanctions. Previously 
where there had been some degree of support (especially following the hostage crisis and 
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Iran/Iraq war), there was little to be found in the European Union and Japan after this 
executive order. Iran was still an oil giant, one that enjoyed close relations with China 
and Russia. If there were a time in which repairs could have been made to the United 
States and Iranian relationship, this was it.  Also considering that the United States had 
supported Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war, only to have Hussein turn on Kuwait and 
thus instigate a war with the United States. (Executive Order, n.d.) 
 Up until this point, the primary focus of the sanctions had been to attempt 
to influence the viewpoint of the Islamic Republic, to more closely reflect the views of 
the American government. Most of the sanctions have to this point targeted the petroleum 
industry of Iran as it was its largest and most valuable export and its health was essential 
to the Iranian economy.  However, a variety of circumstances allowed the Iranian 
economy to stay afloat despite the severity of the sanctions.  
 In 1980, it is estimated that Iran was exporting over a million barrels per 
day. That figure would drop to 822 in 1981 as a result of the effects of the Iranian 
Revolution.  From 1982 to 2005, Iran would increase its daily petroleum export rate 
every year with two exceptions (1997, 2002). Although the export rate statistic does not 
serve as a standalone figure for how the Iranian government was able to deflect the blow 
of sanctions, it does prove that Iran’s petroleum industry did continue to grow. (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, n.d.) 
  Iran was largely able to stay afloat thanks to China’s decision to move 
away from coal-fueled industries to petroleum-based ones. China’s emergence as a world 
power in the later half of the 20th century in a lot of ways is due to the détente initiatives 
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of President Nixon. In addition, it was also the emergence of a newfound relationship 
with the Soviet Union/Russia that allowed Iran to trade with two of the five largest world 
economies. Also, until E.O. 12959, Iran was still able to facilitate petroleum exports to 
the United States through a third party. The effect of the sanctions merely made it more 
complicated to get Iranian crude oil into the United States, it did not restrict it altogether 
at first. Askari, Forrer, Teegen and Yang (p.19) conclude that at most the sanctions 
imposed an inconvenience to the Islamic Republic in regards to its oil trade.  
 If the sanction game is merely played to a draw, then why continue 
imposing them? Is there a coherent strategy that would improve relations with the current 
Iranian government and secure American interests in Iran and the Middle East? What, if 
anything, should future policy leaders in the United States recommend with regard to 
their relationship with Iran? These questions continue to plague policy makers and 
politicians and there does not appear to be a resolution for the near future. A true victory, 
or rather a small step forward, would lie in creating meaningful dialogue with politicians 
who fall into pro-and-anti sanction camps as well as with their Iranian counterparts. 
Meaningful discussion seems to be the best plan for improving relations.  
 Where the economists see the greatest effect of sanctions is in the non-
petroleum export economy of Iran. Such goods include carpets, dried fruits, and nuts. The 
four economists estimate that as much as $14 billion was lost due to embargos of Iranian 
products. Therein lies the question: How does restricting the importing of rugs change the 
rhetoric of the Islamic Republic? The answer is probably not very much. In fact, 
sanctions on these industries probably exacerbated America’s Iranian problem even 
more. Considering that the carpet, fruit and nut industries were not state controlled the 
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effects of the sanctions targeted lay citizens. Citizens that otherwise might have been 
more sympathetic to opening trade channels with the United States were punished for 
their government’s policy, and they didn’t elect the leaders. If anything the sanctions 
continued to allow the Islamic government to conjure up anti-American sentiments, 
which kept dissidents and those who might favor increased cooperation with the United 
States submersed.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
 9/11- PRESENT 
"We have chosen to put on the market songs from Cat Stevens, to show that not 
everything in the West is bad," 
- Reza Mahdavi, Director Islamic Propaganda Organization, 2004 
 In the previous chapter, specific sanctions were highlighted. This chapter 
will focus on the political climate of U.S./Iranian relations since 1979. In particular, it 
will be noted that the extraordinary events of September 11 ended improving relations 
between the United States and Iran and instead caused the relationship to deteriorate to 
levels not seen since 1979.The direction of sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic 
begin to reflect a harder stance by the United States on Iran’s burgeoning nuclear 
program. Significant political movements in Libya, Egypt, and Syria have altered 
traditional Arab power balances in the Middle East. This has had an impact on the Iranian 
government. Political changes in Libya and Egypt have come at the hands of those who 
oppose the incumbent Sunni regimes.  Though, it remains to be seen whether or not the 
vacuum of power will be filled by the majority Shiite Iran. Nonetheless, in the years 
following 9/11, relations between the United States and Iran have remained consistently 
antagonistic, in spite of the constant unrest in neighboring Middle East states.  
 Following the end of the Gulf War (1990-1991) and the Oslo I Accords 
(1992), the United States looked to plug the last hole in the oil tanker, Iran. In 1997, a 
surprise Presidential nomination allowed for the first time in years the faint possibility 
that diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran would improve. Mohammad 
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Khatami, who had been forced to resign as Minister of Culture and Press in 1992 because 
the Iranian Parliament thought he was too liberal, became President. He was previously a 
mid-ranking cleric and scholar of philosophy before he was elected President in 1997 
(Slavin, 2007, p. 105). In the five years after his removal as Minister of Culture and 
Press, Khatami served as director of the Iranian National Library. Though largely 
unknown prior to the election, Khatami won in convincing fashion, as he received nearly 
70% of the popular vote (Slavin, 2007, p.108).  As if Khatami’s ascension to Presidency 
wasn’t inconceivable enough, the President nominated Massoumeh Ebtekar, a woman, as 
his first vice-president. Ebetekar became the highest ranked female political officer in 
Iranian history. Not even during the Shah’s ultra progressive White Revolution would an 
Iranian President have dared nominate a woman for vice-president, for fear of political 
alienation from the influential Islamic clerics. Khatami wrote, “Let us not doubt that 
unless we undergo an inner transformation, we cannot expect external forces to solve our 
problems for us.” (Slavin, 2007, p.108). Although this one quote does not signify a 
complete transformation of Iranian policy towards the United States, it does show a softer 
tone towards rapprochement of relations with the United States than seen previously.  
  Most who write on this subject would agree that Khatami’s election was a 
sign that internally Iran was becoming more moderate in their view of the West (Slavin, 
109).  This eventually culminated in Secretary of State Madeline Albright issuing a 
formal apology to the Iranian government in 2000, for the role the United States played in 
the 1953 coup d’état and leaving the door open for renewing relations with Iran. 
Additionally, the embargo on imports originating from Iran was lifted. This feeling of 
goodwill and hope would be short-lived.  
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 Following the events of 9/11, the United States launched the War on 
Terror, which sought to curb the potential exposure of American interests to weapons of 
mass destruction and terrorism. (Slavin, 2007, p.24) Determined to bring those who 
plotted and orchestrated the September 11 attacks to justice, the United States entered 
Iran’s eastern neighbor, Afghanistan, and began wiping out all al-Qaeda influence. The 
United States used the broad terms of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against 
Terrorists Act of 2001 to invade Iraq in 2003. This was the same Iraq, led by the 
incumbent dictator Saddam Hussein that both the United States and Iran had fought in the 
last twenty years.  When weapons of mass destruction failed to materialize in Iraq, the 
Bush administration looked towards Iran as a potential purchaser and/or developer of 
nuclear arms. Iran’s desire to acquire nuclear technology shouldn’t have been a surprise 
as they had begun pursuing such technology during the 1970’s (Cooper, 2008, p.230).  If 
Iranians were already not upset with American’s waging war on both of their borders, 
Bush’s 2002 State of the Union remarks did no such favors. In his speech, Bush made 
Iran a charter member of the “Axis of Evil” along with North Korea and Iraq (Slavin, 
2007, p.24). His words dampened the promising rhetoric of Khatami and provided 
Islamic hardliners with valuable anti-American propaganda. A semi-unknown, pious son 
of a blacksmith, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, would use Bush’s label as propaganda all the 
way to his election as mayor of Tehran in 2003, and again as President of Iran in 2005. 
  The actions of the United States were met with mixed results in Iran. 
Consider that the United States was actively engaging in eliminating decade-long power 
structures in Afghanistan and Iraq, two countries that had tense relations with the Islamic 
Republic since its creation. The situation in a certain way, was beneficial for the strategic 
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interests of Iran. Additionally, Islamic hardliners were able to use the American façade of 
promoting democracy through civil war, as evidence that the United States had nothing 
but imperialist intentions. A renewed sense of Islamic identity swept through Iran and 
reignited past nationalistic sentiments. Ahmadinejad, armed with religious and popular 
support, maintained that Iran was steadfast in its desire to acquire nuclear weapons. 
Although Iran’s desire to acquire nuclear technology dates back to the 1970’s, 
Ahmadinejad’s declaration in 2006 that Iran had become a nuclear state shocked the 
world. Although the Iranian government contended the enrichment of uranium was for 
peaceful purposes only, the United States and the United Nations acted quickly to impose 
sanctions on Iran.  
 United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 
1835, and 1929 all imposed some degree of sanctions against Iran. The sanctions, that 
were imposed between 2006 and 2009, specifically targeted the Iranian nuclear program.  
The sanctions may have hampered Ahmadinejad’s desire to acquire a nuclear weapon; 
they did not, however, curtail the colorful Iranian President from making outlandish and 
irresponsible comments about Israel and the Holocaust. Ahmadinejad’s comments hurt 
the reputation of Iran. Many Iranians became upset with the direction of the Iranian 
government.  The comments made by Ahmadinejad, as well as his steadfast desire to 
acquire nuclear technologies, prompted the United States to impose additional sanctions 
on Iran in 2010. The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability, and Divestment Act 
of 2010, restored old embargos on Iranian goods exported to the United States.   
 With the 2013 election of the moderate Hassan Rouhani, Iranians voiced 
their opinion that they prefer to have a leader who is willing to engage in dialogue with 
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the West. Their desires were fulfilled when President Obama phoned President Rouhani 
in 2013, making it the first time since 1979 that the heads of state of the United States 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran had spoken to each other.  
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Chapter IX 
 CONCLUSION 
 Though this paper intended to highlight the effectiveness of economic 
sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran, it has become quite apparent that an 
understanding of the history of U.S./Iranian relations is necessary to analyze the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of said sanctions.  This paper showed that the United States 
and Iran have been intertwined in a fluctuating relationship of highs and lows since 1953. 
While there have been some fruits of cooperation in the past, relations between the 
United States and Iran have soured over the last thirty-four years.   
 The decision made by the United States to support the Shah in usurping 
democratically elected Mohammad Mossadeq had a plethora of short-term benefits for 
both the Shah and United States. As the effects of the Cold War began spreading from 
Europe to Asia, Iran under the Shah became an important American ally. During the Cold 
War, the United Sates used Iran as a staging ground for spying on the Soviet Union. The 
United States also allowed the Shah to dictate the worldwide price of oil, with the 
understanding that the Shah would use high oil revenues to purchase arms from the 
United States.  
 The Shah also led the Iranian people through significant social reforms. 
Some of these changes created a sharp division between those in Iran who preferred 
traditional Islamic values and those who were more open to western influences. These 
differences, along with a sharp decline in the Iranian economy as a result of excessive 
military spending, eventually caused the Shah to abdicate his throne in 1979. Ayatollah 
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Khomeini, who had been kicked out of Iran during the time of the Shah’s White 
Revolution, became Supreme Leader of the newly created Islamic Republic of Iran.  
 Loyalists of Ayatollah Khomeini stormed the American embassy in 
Tehran and took 52 Americans hostage in January of 1979. Immediately after the 
hostages were taken, President Jimmy Carter suspended any and all diplomatic relations 
with the Islamic Republic of Iran. At that time, the United States also began imposing 
economic sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, as 
well as harsh sanctions applied throughout the 1980’s, weakened the Iranian economy but 
did not cripple it. Instead, the newly formed Islamic Republic used both events as a way 
of consolidating power and ensuring its survival.  
 Although sanctions continued through the 1990’s, glimpses of 
reconciliation at the end of the millennium provided a glimmer of hope for renewed 
relations. However, the tragic events of 9/11 led to newfound animosity between the 
United States and Iran, even though the later was not involved in the terrorist attacks.  
Instead it was statements made by Presidents Bush and Ahmadinejad that caused both 
Iranian and American policy makers to once again distrust one another. Additionally, 
Iran’s desire to pursue nuclear technology led the United Nations to impose sanctions 
against the Islamic Republic. Some would argue that Iran’s desire to become a nuclear 
state is in response to the continuous presence of the American military in the Middle 
East. While Iran contends its nuclear desires are purely for energy related purposes, the 
United States remains skeptical. However, in spite of the additional sanctions imposed on 
Iran during President Obama’s first term in office, the Presidents of Iran and the United 
States spoke with one another, for the first time in 34 years, in 2013. 
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 At first, this author sought to explore and answer the following questions: 
Have U.S. economic sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran been effective? Have 
they achieved their objective?  Why or why not?  Indeed, the relationship between the 
United States and Iran has had many ups and downs. The period in which sanctions have 
been imposed on Iran has been one in which drastic changes to the political landscape of 
the Middle East have occurred. Given that the relationship between the United States and 
Iran does not exist in a vacuum, it is impossible to say definitively whether or not 
sanctions have been effective. 
  If the goal of the sanctions has been to influence the Islamic Republic’s 
policy to more closely reflect the interests of the United States, then sanctions have been 
ineffective. The majority of sanctions have targeted Iran’s petroleum industry, yet public 
perception in Iran regarding American foreign policy remains varied. If the goal of the 
sanctions has been to curb the growth of the Iranian economy, then sanctions have been 
effective, as Iran has never recovered from the advances made during the time of the 
Shah. However, Iran has managed to keep its economy growing and the quality of life for 
the average Iranian has improved since the Islamic Revolution. 
 Regardless of their effectiveness, sanctions have been the only way that 
the United States and Iran have diplomatically interacted with one another since 1979. 
The lack of diplomacy remains a major roadblock to reconciliation between the two 
countries. Until diplomacy resumes however, the nature of U.S./Iranian relations remains 
as dormant as it did in 1979.  
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 It took extraordinary efforts by the United States and the Shah to 
overthrow Mossadeq in 1953. It took extraordinary efforts by the Iranian people to 
overthrow the Shah in 1979. To think that anything less than extraordinary efforts would 
be needed to take place in order for the United States and Iran to renew relations is 
unlikely. However, given that there seems to be precedent for extraordinary events 
changing the course of relations between the United States and Iran, extraordinary 
measures seem rather ordinary.  
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